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1. Introduction 
Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel networking architecture that brings advanced 
programming capabilities leading to more enhanced behavior achieved by a controlling plane. Unlike 
traditional network architectures, SDN architecture manages forwarding elements through a centralized 
controller that maintains a global view of the network. Consequently, this approach opens a door for 
developing more flexible network services and applications. On the other hand, the increased usage of 
the Internet, requires us to protect all network devices involved in the communication process. Denial 
of Service (DoS) attack is a major threat in which the intruder attempts to prevent legitimate users from 
accessing network resources. This study uses an artificial intelligent based approach to deal with DoS 
attacks by taking the advantage of the central management provided by the SDN approach. 
SDN approach is the fruit of many years' effort to create a programmable network managed by a 
centralized controller. Separation between control plane and data plane requires an interface between the 
controller and forwarding elements. OpenFlow represents a vendor-independent interface which 
translates the high-level orders sent by the controllers to low-level behaviors that can be understood by 
the switches, that handles the L2-L4 network flows. However, OpenFlow has to be extended in order 
to handle the L5-L7 flows [1]. The control plane provides a global view of the network that provides 
help in achieving more enhanced control mechanism for the forwarding plane. A basic SDN architecture 
is illustrated in Fig. 1.  
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 Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an emerging networking paradigm 
that provides an advanced programming capability and moves the control 
functionality to a centralized controller. This paper proposes a two-stage 
novel intelligent approach that takes advantage of the SDN approach to 
detect Denial of Service (DoS) flooding attacks based on calculation of 
packet rate as the first step and followed by Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
classification as the second step. Flow concept is an essential idea in 
OpenFlow protocol, which represents a common interface between an SDN 
switch and an SDN controller. Therefore, our system calculates the packet 
rate of each flow based on flow statistics obtained by SDN controller. Once 
the packet rate exceeds a predefined threshold, the system will activate the 
packet inspection unit, which, in turn, will use the (SVM) algorithm to 
classify the previously collected packets. The experimental results showed 
that our system was able to detect DoS flooding attacks with 96.25% 
accuracy and 0.26% false alarm rate.  
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In SDN architecture, the forwarding decision is made based on flow entries. Each flow entry consists 
of: (i) the header fields, used for matching an incoming packet with this flow, (ii) counters, provide 
useful statics related to that flow and (iii) actions that will be applied to the matched packets [2]. The 
controller is responsible for adding, modifying and deleting the flow entries. Furthermore, the controller 
can make proactive or reactive decisions [3]. Proactive decisions can be used in multipath forwarding 
applications which require less switch-controller communication where all flow entries are already added 
before the incoming traffic arrives at the switch. While in reactive decisions, unmatched packets are 
encapsulated in PACKET_IN messages and forwarded to the controller which, in turn, will reply to 
these messages with the appropriate decision by adding a new flow entry to the related switches in order 
to handle this type of packets by the switch itself [3]. Security applications are considered an example of 
the reactive approach.  
  
 
Fig. 1.  A basic SDN architecture 
In addition, SDN architecture introduces new security challenges (which are out from the scope of 
this work) such as targeting the controller by programming vulnerabilities, error configurations and DoS 
attacks on the controller-switch secure channel [4]. Due to the fact that the data plane is managed 
remotely, both DoS attack and its distributed version (DDoS) have a significant impact in SDN 
paradigm. As a result, it will flood the switch with illegitimate flow entries and consequently, will prevent 
the controller from responding to legitimate flows [5]. 
A simple way to detect DoS attack in SDN is to monitor the volume of each flow using flow-based 
statistics provided by the SDN controller. Such a mechanism was introduced in YuHunag et al. [6] 
where the detection loop consists of two stages. If the total number of the received packets exceeds 3000 
packets per second, the system will move onto the next stage which the incoming packets will be dropped 
when the total number of the received is equal or higher than 800 packets per second for 5 times 
continuously. Braga et al. [7] employed Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) for detecting the distributed 
version of DOS attack. The following features were obtained from each collected flow: Average of 
Packets per flow (APf), Average of Bytes per flow (ABf), Average of Duration per flow (ADf), Percentage 
of Pair-flows (PPf), Growth of Single-flows (GSf), and Growth of Different Ports (GDP). This approach 
showed a lower overhead compared to other traditional approaches. 
 Chen and Yu [8] used a back-propagation neural network in SDN paradigm to detect DoS attacks. 
The experimental study showed that the growing of network topology will lead to an increase in the 
attack detection rate. Wang et al. [9] proposed a graphical probabilistic inference model with an updating 
phase in order to cope with dataset shift problem which appears when the network traffic conditions 
differ from the actual conditions.  
Taekyoung and Yanghee [10] employed a content-oriented networking architecture in which each 
access router is called an “agent”. Each host belongs to a specific agent and sends a content request to 
ISSN 2442-6571 International Journal of Advances in Intelligent Informatics 13 
 Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2018, pp. 11-20 
Latah and Toker (A novel intelligent approach for detecting DoS flooding attacks ...) 
that agent, which, in turn, will deliver the requested contents. A solicitation of the contents is made by 
the agent in order to prevent arbitrary packet forwarding, which improves the security of the network. 
Furthermore, the agent can keep tracking the requested contents as well as the host that creates these 
requests. The agent can discover DDoS attacks if the rate of content requests exceeds a threshold or a 
malicious request is discovered.  
Seungwon et al. [11] proposed a simple algorithm inspired by SYN cookie algorithm for handling 
TCP-ACK packets. This type of packets is used in TCP handshake and can be used to perform a DDoS 
attack on a targeted server. Moreover, fuzzy logic through its ability to derive conclusions from 
insufficient or imprecise data performs an effective way to deal with DoS attacks [12]–[14]. On the other 
hand, information theory-based metrics play a significant role in the detection of DoS attacks due to 
their low computation overhead [15]. During a DoS attack, entropy values decrease significantly [16].  
A fast entropy algorithm was introduced by David and Thomas [17] in order to implement a 
lightweight DDoS detection method. The first step in this algorithm is the flow aggregation, in which 
the flow count of each connection is collected over a particular time interval. The next step is entropy 
calculation. The last step is applying an adaptive algorithm to improve the detection accuracy. However, 
the main disadvantage of this approach is that it mainly depends on calculation the entropy values 
through a specific time-window, which forms a potential overhead in the case of being adopted by an 
SDN controller.  
In this study, we will employ the flow statistics, which can be easily obtained by the SDN controller, 
in order to calculate the packet rate of each flow and subsequently discriminate the potential malicious 
flows that may contribute to a DoS flooding attack. After that, we use Support Vector Machines (SVM) 
algorithm for classifying the collected traffic. 
2. Method 
2.1. Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
Support vector machine (SVM) [18] is a statistical machine learning algorithm that uses the idea of 
finding the optimal hyperplane separation of labeled instances in a given data set which leads to a better 
generalization of the unseen data (Fig. 2). SVM and its various modified versions [19], [20] are widely 
used in intrusion detection systems. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Linear support vector machine. 
For a given data set }),(,...,),(,),({ 2211 nn yxyxyxZ  where 
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i Rx  and 1iy which is the label 
of the instances and ni ...,,2,1  the set of hyperplanes in SVM can be written as:  
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1;1  ii ybxw   
These hyperplanes can be combined by the following inequality: 
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where C is a regularization parameter which affects the trade-off between the allowed errors in training 
phase and margin size. Large values of C lead to a smaller-margin which may cause an over-fitting case. 
Furthermore, to deal with nonlinear cases, a kernel function can be used to map the data set to a higher-
dimensional space as shown as (6).  
)()(),( j
T
iji xxxxK    
   The most commonly used kernel functions are polynomial and Radial basis function (RBF). The 
RBF kernel which is used by our SVM classifier is given by (7). 
0,)(exp),(
2
  jiji xxxxK
  
where γ is the kernel parameter. 
 
2.2. Dataset 
   This experimental study is conducted by generating both volume-based and protocol-based DoS 
attacks and taking into consideration the case in which the attacker may send benign traffic besides the 
malicious one. By this means, a data set which consists of 321 instances of normal traffic and 639 
instances of attack traffic, was generated during the evaluation stage where D-ITG tool [21] is used to 
generate UDP, ICMP flooding attacks whereas scapy library (secdev.org) is used for generating SYN 
flooding attacks. In this study, we generate DoS attacks with different rates (100,500,1000) pps. Using 
D-ITG tool one can generate UDP, ICMP floods with different payload size.  
As shown in Fig. 3, we generated a UDP flood to a destination host which has 10.0.0.4 IP address 
with constant payload size (500 bytes) and constant packet rate (100 pps) for 1 second (1000 ms). We 
also assume that each IP address of each packet was not spoofed.  
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Fig. 3.  Sending a UDP flood using D-ITG tool. 
   Similarly, scapy library is used to generate SYN floods. As shown in Fig. 4, we lunch a SYN flood 
attack via Python/scapy script. Finally, we wrote a Python script that collects packet features from each 
corresponding host for periodically every 4-seconds based on scapy library which actually comes with a 
built-in packet sniffer and used widely as packet manipulation, capture, modification and replay library 
[22].  
 
Fig. 4.  Sending a SYN flood using python script with scapy library. 
In addition, the collected features were normalized using equation (8).  
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2.3. Experimental Setup 
In order to evaluate the system, we used Mininet, an open-source SDN emulator where the 
experiment was conducted in a virtual environment (Linux Ubuntu 14.04/Virtual Box) on Intel i5 
machine with 12 GB of RAM. The controller part was implemented using POX controller. The packet 
inspection unit, on the other hand, was implemented using a combination of scapy and sklearn Python 
libraries. As shown in Fig. 5, our testbed consists of 9 virtual hosts connected to different OpenFlow 
switches. The bandwidth of each link is 1 Mb/s. The connection between the SDN controller and the 
hosts was done locally where the SDN controller can communicate with any device and trigger the 
packet inspection unit. By this means, one can use the “util/m” script provided by Mininet to control 
Mininet hosts. For instance, we can write the following command in Linux Ubuntu terminal to access 
host1 in Mininet environment: 
 
-> mininet/util/m h1 ifconfig  
 
Instead of running ifconfig command, the SDN controller (i.e. POX controller) runs a Python script, 
which represents our packet inspection unit. In this context, it is worth noting that securing the 
communication between the SDN controller and the corresponding host is out of the scope of this 
study.  
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Fig. 5.  Testbed used for our experiment. 
2.4. Performance Evaluation 
To evaluate our classifier, we applied 10-fold cross-validation where the dataset is partitioned into 
ten equally-sized folds. We train the model on 90% of the samples and then test the class labels of the 
remaining 10%. This procedure is repeated 10 times. The accuracy for each fold is determined by (9). 
)( FPFNTNTP
TNTP
Accuracy



  
where True Positives (TP) is the total number of abnormal traffic instances correctly classified as 
abnormal traffic; True Negatives (TN) is the total number of normal traffic instances correctly classified 
as normal traffic; False Positives (FP) is the total number of normal traffic instances falsely classified as 
abnormal traffic and False Negatives (FN) is total number of abnormal traffic instances falsely classified 
as normal traffic. The accuracy of the whole folds is used to compute the final accuracy. In addition, the 
false alarm rate for each fold is calculated by (10). 
FPTN
FP
ratealarmFalse


  
3. The Proposed Method 
In this section, we present our proposed approach which consists of two stages.  
3.1. The first stage 
In this stage includes packet rate calculation based on the flow statistics collected by the SDN 
controller. Once the packet rate exceeds a predefined threshold, the controller will activate the packet 
inspection unit which is responsible for collecting packet statistics, applying SVM algorithm and 
notifying the SDN controller about the classification results. As depicted in Fig. 6, the packet inspection 
unit is implemented on each host separately, where the controller can activate the packet inspection unit 
remotely and take the proper decision based on a binary classification step conducted by a previously 
trained SVM classifier. 
In volume-based attacks, the intruder sends numerous packets from different sources to the target 
server. This consumes a huge amount of network bandwidth. While in protocol-based attacks, the 
attacker exploits a weakness in the Internet protocols which can lead to a complete denial of service in 
targeted server's resources. The packet rate is a significant metric which was used in [12] for 
implementing a host-based DoS attack detection system using Mamdani’s fuzzy inference model. In our 
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proposed method, however, we calculate the packet rate using equation (11) based on the flow statistics 
collected periodically every 10 seconds by the SDN controller. 
𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
  (11)
If the packet rate is greater than or equal to 100 packets per second, then the system will move into 
the next stage and it will be discussed in the next subsection. The reason of selecting low values of the 
packet rate (to trigger the next stage) is that during our experimental study we found that the 
performance of the selected controller (i.e. POX controller) was affected significantly by flooding attacks 
that exceeds 100 packets per second, and therefore we concluded that it can be more efficient to detect 
these type of DoS attacks starting from the mentioned threshold. 
 
Fig. 6.  An overview of our proposed approach. 
3.2. The Second Stage 
The aim of the second stage is to reduce the false alarm rate. Once the packet rate exceeds the 
predefined threshold, the controller will activate the packet inspection unit. At this point, packet-based 
statistics will be collected during a 4-second period by the packet inspection unit so that it can be used 
by our SVM classifier. As a consequence, it will determine whether the attack is happened or not. The 
collected features in the second stage are shown at Table 1. 
Table 1.  Collected features for the classification stage 
Feature Description 
Total_pkt Total number of collected packets 
Total_payload Total payload size 
SYN_no Total number of SYN flags 
ACK_no Total number of ACK flags 
TCP_no Total number of TCP packets 
UDP_no Total number of UDP packets 
ICMP_no Total number of ICMP packets 
Protocol_no Total number of used protocols. 
Port_no Total number of used ports. 
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4. Results and Discussion 
Using our SVM classifier, the accuracy and false alarm rate for each fold is shown at Table 2. The 
average accuracy for 10-fold cross validation is 96.25% whereas the average false alarm rate is 0.26%. As 
a result, the SVM classifier showed very low false positives compared to the total number of false 
negatives. 
Table 2.  Results of 10-fold cross-validation 
 1-Fold 2-Fold 3-Fold 4-Fold 5-Fold 6-Fold 7-Fold 8-Fold 9-Fold 10-Fold 
TP 57 70 71 69 63 50 57 66 76 59 
TN 37 26 25 27 32 42 38 3 19 37 
FN 1 0 0 0 1 4 1 27 1 0 
FP 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Accuracy (%) 97.91 100 100 100 98.96 95.83 98.96 71.88 98.96 100 
False alarm rate (%) 2.63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Fig. 7 shows the detection results based on the implementation of our two-stage approach where the 
SDN controller updates the flow table of the corresponding switch by sending a flow mod instruction 
that deletes the malicious flows. Thereafter, the controller updates the firewall module by adding the 
corresponding malicious source MAC address in the blocked list. 
 
Fig. 7.  Results for implementing our proposed system based on the POX controller. 
In addition, Table 3 shows a comparison between the SVM approach and the other supervised 
machine learning approaches. In terms of false alarm rate, the SVM approach has shown the best results. 
In terms of accuracy, the random forest classifier has shown a better accuracy compared to SVM 
approach. However, the highest accuracy was achieved using a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) neural 
network (a single hidden layer with 4 neurons).  
Table 3.  Comparision between SVM and other supervised machine learning approaches 
Classifier 
10-fold cross-validation 
Accuracy False alarm rate 
Logistic regression 90.417% 5.24% 
kNN (k-nearest neighbors) 94.167% 8.87 % 
Naïve bayes 94.375% 5.52 % 
Decision trees 95.354% 6.55 % 
SVM (C=1, γ = 1000) 96.25% 0.26 % 
Random forest 97.812% 3.93 % 
Neural network (MLP) 98.958% 1.004% 
5. Conclusion 
By this study we have proposed, designed and implemented a two-stage novel DoS flooding attack 
detection method in SDN paradigm. In the first stage, when the packet rate exceeds a predefined 
threshold, the system will move onto the next stage which employs SVM algorithm to investigate the 
suspected traffic. In our experimental studies, we showed that the controller can communicate with any 
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device and trigger the next stage (packet inspection unit) in Mininet environment. Our proposed system 
was able to detect DoS flooding attacks with 96.25% accuracy and 0.26% false alarm rate based on SVM 
classifier with RBF-kernel. Compared to other classifiers, the SVM approach has shown the lowest false 
positive rate. In addition, the MLP-neural network approach has shown the highest accuracy. We 
conclude that the integration between the SDN approach and machine learning techniques formed a 
promising solution for providing more secure networks. Our future work will be focused on using the 
SDN paradigm for detecting application-layer DoS attacks as well as investigating the efficiency of other 
multi-stage approaches in order to identify more complex types of network attacks. 
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